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"A Desert Grows Between Us"'

The

Sovereignty Paradox at the Intersection
of Tribal and Federal Courts
Caprice L. Roberts*

Having been raised in the white society, I can understand and communicate
on your level-it is an adjustment I have had to make in order to succeed in
your world. But I can also understand and communicate with my people, in
our way. The many differences in our cultures (such as communication and
understanding) may to you seem subtle or superficial when, in fact, they are
quite profound. But this is because you think like a white man and I like an
Indian. Our different perspectives make my attempt to impart to you the
2
Native viewpoint that much more difficult-and that much more urgent.

Anyone seeking to understand the role of American federal courts in our
constitutional democracy would be well-served by reading Steve McNeill's

note, In a Class by Themselves: A Proposalto IncorporateTribal Courts into
the FederalSystem Without Compromising Their Unique Status as "Domestic
Dependent Nations."3 For the federal courts scholar, it is through an
exploration of federal court interactions and limits that we can truly appreciate
the expanse of federal power and the potential for abuses.4 Thus, McNeill's
note holds interest for the (dominant) legal academy. The paramount value of
1. Frank Pommersheim, Desert Father, 28 LEGAL STUD. F. (OFF THE RECORD-AN
ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY BY LAws.) 135 (2004) (capitalization altered).
* Visiting Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University; Professor of Law, West
Virginia University. J.D., Washington and Lee University; B.A., Rhodes College. The author
expresses sincere gratitude for the thoughtful review and suggestions of Andrew M. Wright and
Joan M. Shaughnessy.
2. Mark Delgado, Dear Mr. Dalby, in PRIZED WRITING: THE ESSAY SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL WRITING (1989-1990), available at http://prizedwriting.ucdavis.edu/past/19891990/delgado.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. R. Stephen McNeill, In a Class by Themselves: A Proposalto IncorporateTribal Courts
into the Federal Court System Without Compromising Their Unique Status as "Domestic
DependentNations," 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 283 (2008).
4. See Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and the FederalCourts: Applying the Myths and the
Methods ofMarbury v. Madison to TribalCourts' CriminalJurisdiction,36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 77,77
(2004) ("[B]y examining Federal Indian Law one better understands that the American
constitutional project includes many instances in which power is claimed by force and justified by
necessity.").
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McNeill's scholarship, however, lies in its aim to provide workable solutions
for litigants. He seeks to honor the dignity of tribal sovereignty and further
tribal aspirations, with due regard for the interests of non-Indians. The breadth
and depth of McNeill's work leave no surprise as to why the Washington and
Lee Law Review would bestow upon him its highest distinction.
McNeill offers a thoughtful treatment of issues critical to tribal
jurisdiction. As Professor Frank Pommersheim observes, "[f]ederal Indian law
has yet to resolve [certain] paradoxes, develop coherent theory, and establish a
reliable conceptual and human framework within which to engage modem
Indian law issues and tribal aspirations. 5 McNeill's ambitious and detailed
work seeks to inject some coherence by providing "a mechanism for tribal
courts to fit 6in the American court system, while maintaining the uniqueness of
tribal law.",

According to Professor Judith Resnik, "the official canon of the federal
courts has not included the relationship between the federal courts and Indian
tribes."7 In fact, she adds: "Little is said about the federal courts' role- 8
sometimes destroying Indian tribal culture and occasionally respecting it."
McNeill's treatment offers an opportunity to accomplish Professor Resnik's
narrative prescription: "to review the stories we have been telling about the
federal courts, to acknowledge the role played by brute force, [and] to make
plain the limits of constitutionalism and of history in explicating
constitutionalism."' 9 His diagnosis' ° of existing tribal law in the federal system12
shows "the limits of constitutionalism."" Yet, McNeill's suggested solution
may demonstrate "the possibilities of lawmaking to enable dignified
interactions among and across inter-dependent 3sovereigns so as to reflect the
hopes for which Marbury v. Madison stands."'
Scholars describing such problems and proposing solutions encounter the
potential pitfall of essentialism-the assumption that all who belong to a
9 (1995).

5.

FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS

6.

McNeill, supra note 3, at 332.

7.

Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, andthe FederalCourts,

56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671, 758 (1989).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 759.
10. McNeill, supra note 3, at 297-309 (exploring problems presented by tribal
jurisdiction with the federal structure and with the states).
11. Resnik, supra note 4, at 135.
12. McNeill, supra note 3, at 320-40 (outlining the multi-faceted components of his
"more tailored solution").
13. Resnik, supranote 4, at 135.
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particular group possess like concerns and traits. A fruitful dialogue here often
necessitates that we speak in terms of "tribal courts," "Indian Americans," and
"non-Indians." Yet, any relevant discourse benefits from acknowledging the
anti-essentialist reality about which Professor Pommersheim respectfully
reminds us:
A rich diversity of landscapes, cultures, histories, and people exists
throughout Indian country. This country includes, for example, 278 federal
reservations, ranging from that of the Navajo Tribe, with 160,000 members
and fifteen million acres located in parts of Arizona, New Mexico, and
that consist of only one or two families
Utah, to a few California rancherias
14
living on less than fifty acres.
Recall the historical landscape: "Measured separatism soon gave way to a
federal policy of vigorous assimilation, with dire consequences for the concept
of reservations as islands of Indianness. Homelands were cut open, and the
bright line separating Indians and non-Indians was obliterated."15 Further,
"there is much to learn from thinking about both the differences and the
similarities" between Indian tribes and the state, 16 as well as between Indians
and non-Indians. Accordingly, the uniqueness of the people, problems, and
existing structures requires thoughtful implementation of any proposed
solution. In addition, such issues cannot be ripped from their current and
historical contexts. McNeill ventures into this complex arena with the goal of
incorporating tribal courts into the federal court structure. This ambitious, bigpicture solution dictates some leniency with assumptions in order to explore the
theoretical benefits of his proposal, despite the ultimate precision and intricacy
that would be necessary to implement any solution.
Like any serious scholar, McNeill situates his note in the context of an
existing, impressive body of scholarship, and he conveys to the reader the
import of his work. Notably and regrettably, "The bountiful literature of federal
courts' jurisprudence does not, however, consider problems of the relationship
between Indian tribes, the federal government, and the states." 17 According to
McNeill, his proposal is timely because of the increased likelihood for litigation
between non-Indians and tribal members and the concomitant necessity for

POMMERSHEIM, supra note 5, at 7.
15. Id. at 38.
16. Resnik, supranote 7, at 701.
17. Id. at 676. In Professor Resnik's Dependent Sovereigns article, she seeks to "learn
what that silence has to teach" and "show what Indian tribe cases have to bring to federal courts'
jurisprudence, to what is meant by the concept of state sovereignty and allocation of power
between the state and federal governments." Id. at 678-79.

14.
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access to a meaningful judicial forum. 18 McNeill does not utilize the word
"meaningful." Instead, he describes the imperative of access to tribal courts
that would garner respect on par with parallel state and federal courts. 19 The
diminished respect for tribal courts stems, according to McNeill, from
"unsettled" law regarding tribal courtjurisdiction. 20 A symptom ofthe negative
perception is non-Indians' attempts to avoid the jurisdiction of tribal courts
altogether. 2' In order to correct the misperception of tribal court import and
"promote tribal sovereignty," McNeill calls for laws that create a "coherent role
22
for the tribal courts within the federal system.,
It should give one pause to read McNeill's antiseptic designation of
"unsettled law" as the source of diminished respect for tribal court jurisdiction.
Perception of tribal court jurisdiction by a majority legal culture constitutes a
weighty topic unto itself. Professor Robert A. Williams, for one, suggests that
the historical Supreme Court perspective of the purpose of tribal jurisdiction is
regrettably "that Indians have always possessed diminished and inferior rights
compared to the white population under United States law." 23 According to
Professor Williams, William Rehnquist, then-Associate Justice, revived
"blatantly racist nineteenth-century judicial language of Indian savagery and
white supremacy. 2 4 Twenty years after Brown v. Board of Education,25 the
Court's language in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe26 offers a
breathtakingly ethnocentric view of tribal sovereignty:
In In re Mayfield, the Court noted that the policy of Congress had been to
allow the inhabitants of the Indian country "such power of self-government
as was thought to be consistent with the safety of the white population with
which they may have come in contact, and to encourage them
2 7 as far as
possible in raising themselves to our standard of civilization.

18.

McNeill, supra note 3, at 285-86.

19. Id. at286.
20. Id. at 285.
21. Id. at 285-86.
22. Id. at 286.
23. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON-THE REHNQUIST COURT,
RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM INAMERICA xxiii (2005).
24. Id.

INDIAN

25. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954) (holding that school segregation
violates "the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment").
26. Oliphant v. Suquarnish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that Indian
tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians even in cases involving crimes against Indians
on Indian land) (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 204.
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In this new millennium, is tribal sovereignty still a doctrine of convenience to a
dominant population or a meaningful wellspring of intercultural respect?
McNeill's future work could benefit from grappling with the deeper roots
of this diminished respect, both as a topic worthy of continued inquiry and for
any ramifications such jurisdictional perspectives might have on his policy
prescriptions. If he were to offer a different vision for the purpose of tribal
courts than those expressed in Oliphantand its hostile progenitors, there could
be significant import beyond the jurisdictional.
McNeill carefully explores and discards political solutions that attempt to
"fix" the problems by reframing tribes as states, foreign countries,
administrative agencies, or federal territories.28 Instead, he presents and
defends what he describes as "a more tailored solution." McNeill seeks an
antidote to existing jurisdictional problems, e.g., (i) jurisdictional overlaps that
create confusion and (ii) jurisdictional gaps that fail to provide needed justice.
He desires clarity and uniformity to achieve tribal respect. His proposal calls
for the expansion of tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction. 29 To balance this
expansion, McNeill suggests diminishing existing state and federal court
jurisdiction. 30 To achieve it, he demands federal congressional action.
Of course, added tribal responsibility necessitates an increase in the
quantity and quality of tribal courts, i.e., McNeill's "A Court for Every
Tribe,"' 1 appellate courts for larger tribes, 32 and a new federal circuit court of
appeals-the "Court of Appeals for the Indian Circuit. 3 3 McNeill should
examine the sources and ramifications of any such exercise of congressional
power vis-i-vis federal courts. Pursuant to Article III of the United States
Constitution, "Congress may from time to time ordain and establish" inferior
federal courts.34 Further, "[t]he judicial Power" of such courts "shall extend to
all Cases... arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ....
Accordingly, Article III provides broad congressional power to create and
redraw federal courts and to alter the scope of federal court jurisdiction. 36 Any
28. McNeill, supra note 3, at 309-17.
29. Id. at 320-21.
30. Id. at 328-29.
31. Id. at 330.
32. Id. at 330-31.
33. Id. at 331-32. McNeill also suggests an array of procedural devices for streamlining
interactions between tribal and state courts. Id. at 332-40.
34. U.S. CONST. art. IIl.
35. Id.
36. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) ("The Congressional power to ordain
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congressional maneuver, however, must comport with other constitutional
strictures such as equal protection and separation of powers. Even granting
congressional plenary power regarding the tenets of McNeill's proposal, the
wisdom 37 of Congress disrupting the apple cart raises distinct, thorny challenges
worthy of further exploration.
In an effort to maintain tribal uniqueness within new bounds of
constitutionalism, McNeill further provides that "at least half the judges should
be Indians" on the new federal circuit court. McNeill may have unwittingly
stepped into the legal briar patch with this proposal. He has yet to analyze the
full implications of federal court jurisprudence. Specifically, the composition
of a new federal circuit court ostensibly would require any elevated tribal judge
to undergo the "Advice and Consent" mechanisms-presidential nomination
and Senate confirmation-as required for all Article IIIjudges. 38 Significantly,
all such Article III judges would receive life tenure. 39 Further, the creation of a
new court likely would require a congressional expansion of the scope of
federal appellate court decisionmaking authority to hear cases on review of
tribal decisions. Putting the constitutional thicket aside, McNeill opines that
Indians would preserve Indian culture and law by injecting an otherwise absent
tribal perspective, while the non-Indians, "more familiar with the Constitution,"
and establish inferior courts includes the power 'of investing them with jurisdiction either
limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them inthe exact degrees
and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good."' (quoting Cary v.
Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845))). For a seminal exploration of the nuances of limits
and consequences of congressional power over federal court jurisdiction, see Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
The Power ofCongress to Limit the JurisdictionofFederal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,
66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953). For the author's contribution regarding congressional efforts to
remove federal court jurisdiction, see Caprice L. Roberts, JurisdictionStrippingin ThreeActs:
A Three String Serenade, 51 VILL. L. REv. 593 (2006).
37. See Gerald Gunther, CongressionalPower to CurtailFederalCourtJurisdiction: An
OpinionatedGuide to the OngoingDebate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 898 (1984) (acknowledging
congressional plenary power over federal courts, but advising a wisdom analysis examining
"what sound constitutional statesmanship admonishes").
38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President "shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the supreme Court, and
all other Officers of the United States").
39. Perhaps McNeill would modify his proposal to create a new federal court that would
be more comparable to an agency or bankruptcy court. Such a modification, however, may not
render the desired respect and may raise other challenges. See Resnik, supra note 4, at 131
("[G]iven Article III's vesting of judicial power in courts with life-tenured judges, one could
readily question the legitimacy of adjudication within agencies and by bankruptcy and
magistrate judges, all of whom render federal judgments but lack the constitutionally stipulated
attributes of life tenure and protected salaries." (citing Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes
His Justice": Inventing the FederalDistrictCourtsofthe Twentieth Centuryfor the Districtof
Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 625-43 (2002))).
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will "better protect the rights of [non-Indians].,, 40 This good-faith suggestion
will no doubt gamer criticism. 4 1 For example, it embeds "identity-politics"
assumptions and, even if relying on widely accepted generalizations, his
proposal includes constitutionally problematic quota-like dictates.
Regardless of the ultimate solution, there are a number of lenses through
which to view the issue of tribal jurisdiction. Tribal sovereignty coexists, and
must contend, with the United States constitutional system, including the
overlays of federalism and separation of powers. The result presents complex
choices as to the appropriate analytical model for such trans-jurisdictional
issues raised: diplomacy, federalism, or separation of powers.
Interestingly, McNeill chides Congress for its failure to wield its arguable
constitutional plenary power,4 2 and he criticizes the federal judiciary for
exerting too much power and misusing its reach by "drastically limiting the
extent of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians" to the severe detriment of
tribal sovereignty.4 3 McNeill echoes Professor Pommersheim who has
characterized the federal courts' exercise of plenary power to minimize tribal
jurisdiction as "a rogue doctrine used to curb tribal sovereignty. '"44 While the
Supreme Court devises the modem jurisdictional
doctrines of limitation for
S• 45
tribal courts that hinge on party classification, McNeill laments that Congress
sits idly by as tribal sovereignty suffers.46
40. McNeill, supra note 3, at 332.
41. Before concluding the note, McNeill dutifully addresses some anticipated criticisms of
assimilation and the costs of implementation. Id. at 343-45.
42. McNeill asserts that plenary power over Indians rests solely with Congress. Id. at
287. He reluctantly acknowledges the existence of broad criticism of this plenary power
doctrine, but stands on the practical reality of Congress's historical reliance on this power. Id.
For a collection of the scholarly criticism, see Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little orNot So
Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing in Indian Law?, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271, 271 n.4

(2003). McNeill adds that, despite the lack of significant constitutional grounding, the federal
judiciary regularly and consistently recognizes Congress's plenary power over Indian tribes.
McNeill, supra note 3, at 289.
43. McNeill, supra note 3, at 286. According to McNeill, the Supreme Court, via "its
own brand of plenary power," has destroyed the effect of congressional plenary power over
Indians by narrowly circumscribing tribal court jurisdiction. Id. at 289. Professor
Ponimersheim details the evolution of the Court's adoption of its own, albeit inferior, brand of
plenary power in this arena. Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the FederalJudiciary:
Opportunitiesand Challengesfor a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 58 MoNT. L. REv. 313,327-29
(1997).
44. Pommersheim, supra note 42, at 284; McNeill, supranote 3, at 286 n. 11.
45. See McNeill, supra note 3, at 289 (explaining that the modem federal judicial
rationale keys tribal jurisdiction to whether the parties are: "'non-Indian, Indian nonmember,
and member"' (quoting David A. Castleman, PersonalJurisdictionin Tribal Courts, 154 U. PA.
L. REv. 1253, 1259 (2006))).

46.

Id.
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The locus of power in determining federal court jurisdiction itself, without
the complication of tribal-relations questions, presents vexing problems and
generates significant scholarly debate. In many regards, McNeill's call for
congressional action is a separation-of-powers critique. He would rather see
the political branch establish the contours of tribal-federal jurisdictional
relations than the courts. His method presents numerous questions sounding in
political science and constitutional law. His solution requires an evaluation of
which constitutional decisionmaker is best suited to decide such policy. His
insistence on congressional action begs the question of whether Indian tribes
will be better served by Congress's rather than the Court's dictates. Ultimately,
a separation-of-powers critique that focuses on the import of court role posits:
insular minorities addressed in
Isn't political failure the very danger for 47
CaroleneProducts' infamous footnote four?
McNeill proposes that Congress should pass a flexible, comprehensive
statute regarding the scope of tribal court jurisdiction with the federal system.48
He admirably seeks a comprehensive solution that sets its sights high.
Specifically, he directs Congress to these primary aims: "(1) maximizing tribal
sovereignty, (2) protecting the constitutional rights of non-Indians,
(3) protecting Indian culture, and (4) providing a substantial amount of
flexibility to better
accommodate the various differences among individual
49
Indian tribes.,
The tribal sovereignty aim will prove tricky given the cabinedsovereignty
within which tribes exist. American infrastructure overlays onto tribes-it
dictates when it desires and walks away when it pleases. American legal
institutions, including Congress, have shaped, molded, mocked, rejected, and
contained Indian law and culture. Now, do we prefer that Congress wield its
supposed plenary power to cure all the ills resulting from the initial faulty
premise? The inherent paradox of dependent sovereignty is that true tribal
sovereignty will remain beyond grasp.
Perhaps, with a reader's fresh eyes to these problems, one wonders
whether McNeill rejected a better model-the diplomatic paradigm. 50 It is
47. United States v.Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (upholding a
congressional prohibition on the interstate shipment of certain milk products, but proposing, in
now-infamous footnote four, heightened judicial review for legislation affecting the rights of
"discrete and insular minorities").
48. McNeill, supra note 3, at 286.
49. Id. at 320.
50. Federalism is not particularly attractive. The federalism and territorial models are
inherently subservient, perhaps more even than originally constitutionally contemplated. This
subservient cast is fatally flawed for any system seeking to achieve tribal sovereignty. McNeill
rejects treating tribes as states because the treatment would result in forced assimilation and loss
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arguably a better model because its premise is to give due regard to the
coequality of equal power relationships. As McNeill acknowledges, legislation
treating Indian tribes as "independent foreign nations," for example, "could1
provide the greatest amount of protection for inherent tribal sovereignty.'
Diplomatic transnational models, however, conjure cumbersome images of
letters rogatory and nonbinding principles of comity. Thus, any diplomatic
paradigm must focus its policy energy on eliminating cumbersome elements.
McNeill discards the diplomatic route, however, because, for example, he
views that Congress is "highly unlikely" to "surrender its plenary control" and
would fear being at the "mercy of Indian tribes, who could demand whatever
they wanted in exchange for passage through their territory. 5 2 He continues on
to paint a picture of dire straits if Congress abandons Indian tribes "to sink or
swim on their own" because some tribes lack military force and court systems
such that "lawlessness would run rampant."03 McNeill's framework presents a
"parade of horribles" that may overstate the consequences, especially if one
views sovereignty as a "bundle of rights." Further, any ultimate solution may
be unable to rely on one political branch, especially one like Congress with its
investment in the plenary status quo. McNeill might reconsider whether
perhaps a diplomatic approach, if designed flexibly via collective action of
multi-branches and tribes, would allow us to keep the sights aimed high
towards a fuller actualization of tribal aspirations.
Should McNeill consider stronger legislative action? For example,
Professor Pommersheim maintains that Congress should pass a constitutional
amendment.54 He argues that the Constitution's one primary reference5 5 to
Indian tribes in the "Indian Commerce Clause" 56 assumes that the tribes possess
of tribal sovereignty. Id. at 311-13.
51. Id. at 314.
52. Id. at 315.
53. Id.
54. Frank Pommersheim, ConstitutionalShadows: The Missing Narrativein Indian Law,
80 N.D. L. REv. 743, 757 (2004).

55. See Resnik, supra note 4, at 81 ("Yet, despite these slim references, a large body of
United States law-'Federal Indian Law'-exists."); id. at 130 ("Federal Indian Law is a
struggle to fabricate a legal regime in the context of a text-based constitutional discourse when
textual dictates are absent.").
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.") (emphasis added). According to Professor
Pommersheim, "with" signals an assumed recognition of sovereignty and clarifies the Indian
Commerce Clause's purpose "that in the two sovereign model in the United States Constitution
the primary, if not sole, sovereign that has authority to interact directly with the tribes is the
federal sovereign and that the states have no authority." Pommersheim, supranote 54, at 746.
Another reference to Indian tribes is in the Treaty Making Clause. The Constitution further
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separate sovereignty.17 Yet, congressional action has since failed to recognize,58
at least fully and consistently, this realization of tribal sovereignty.
Accordingly, he passionately argues in favor of "an amendment to the United
States Constitution, that for the modem era, clearly identifies the constitutional
status of tribes, and recognizes in a true, permanent, constitutional sense for the
future of constitutional status and recognition of tribal sovereignty."5 9 A
constitutional amendment would go far towards servicing the goal of tribal
sovereignty. Ultimately, McNeill opts in favor of congressional action, rather
than a constitutional amendment, presumably based on the relative political
chances for success.
Assuming that McNeill's proposal for legislative reform warrants serious
consideration, interested advocates would benefit from an exploration of
contexts beyond the domestic. Comparative law models may offer creative
solutions regarding the rights of indigenous peoples and the recognition of
tribal legal decisions. 60 Further, international law may already provide a path to
tribal aspirations if only the United States would follow such guides. For
example, Article 3 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples provides: "Indigenous peoples have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.", 61 The
Declaration also commands that states employ a process for recognizing the
legal structures of indigenous people.62 An American endorsement of such
self-determination principles would service many of the tribal goals McNeill
outlines. Notably, however, America's parallel declaration lacks any mention
of self-determination.63 Progress thus may depend on altering American hearts
and minds as well as changing the laws.
excludes "Indians" from particular apportionment calculations. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3
(excluding Indians from apportionment calculations for Representatives); U.S. CONST. amend.

XIV, § 2 (same).
57. Pommersheim, supra note 54, at 745.
58. Id. at 748-50.
59. Id. at 757.
60. See, e.g., Menno Boldt & J. Anthony Long, TribalTraditionsandEuropean-Western
PoliticalIdeologies: The Dilemma of Canada'sNative Indians, 17 CAN. J. POL. Sci. 537, 55253 (1984) (considering alternative self-determination models and suggesting that the ideal
model for Indian negotiation of self-determination may be stateless nationhood).
61. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report to the GeneralAssembly on the FirstSession of
the Human Rights Council,61 art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/IHRC/1/L.10 (June 30, 2006) (annexing the
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).
62. Id. at 68 art. 27.
63. Russell A. Miller, Collective DiscursiveDemocracyas the Indigenous Right to SelfDetermination,31 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 341,343 (2007). Professor Miller provocatively extends
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In sum, McNeill's title betrays the underlying paradox: How do you
honor tribal sovereignty for tribes that are not de facto sovereign? In other
words, if you have de facto subjugation of a population, is there any value to
honoring the legal fiction of sovereignty? In the current situated existence, is
real self-determination possible?
Reminiscent of Professor Derrick Bell's fundamental "American
contradiction" for Black America, 64 will modem day reality continue to fail to
deliver on the constitutional promise of equality and self-determination for
all? 65 Could this shortfall include Native Americans? Technically, given the
scant constitutional references to Indians in the Constitution,66 Professor Bell's
fundamental contradiction theory may require extra-constitutional bases, such
as treaties, to reach Native Americans unless we agree with Professor
Pommersheim's assumed sovereignty constitutional analysis. The underlying
rationale of Professor Bell's sentiments, however, should extend through the
force of logic. Specifically, Professor Bell and other critical race scholars
worry that when we wrap ourselves in the cloak of liberty and freedom,67
Jirgen Habermas's theory of discursive democracy to collectives-"indigenous peoples and the
state in which they reside." Id. at 358. According to Professor Miller, this adaptation of
discursive democracy aligns with indigenous self-determination and ultimately "respects the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and imposes discursive obligations on indigenous
peoples and the states in which they reside." Id. at 373.
64. Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles,99 HARV. L. REv. 4,4 (1985).
Professor Bell describes:
[T]he essential need to accept what has become the American contradiction[:] The
framers made a conscious, though unspoken, sacrifice of the rights of some in the
belief that this forfeiture was necessary to secure the rights of others in a society
embracing, as its fundamental principle, the equality of all.
Id. Professor Bell continues: "And thus the framers, while speaking through the Constitution in
an unequivocal voice, at once promised freedom for whites and condemned blacks to slavery."
Id.; see also Duncan Kennedy, The Structure ofBlackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv.
205, 211-15 (1979) (offering the phrase, "fundamental contradiction," as a phenomenon when
"[m]ost participants in American legal culture believe that the goal of individual freedom is at
the same time dependent on and incompatible with the communal coercive action that is
necessary to achieve it").
65. Even if one indulges the contractual analogy, the notion of constitutional promises,
even if made, may be illusory in the particulars of the alleged promises. For example, a promise
of self-determination may have little meaning upon which reasonable minds could agree.
Professor Miller notes "the imprecise, inconclusive and ill-defined nature of the international
law right to self-determination." Miller, supra note 63, at 343; see also id. at 343 n.14
(collecting scholarship regarding the slippery nature of the term self-determination).
66. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing the existence and import of
slim references to Indians in the Constitution).
67. Bell, supra note 64, at 7 ("Contradiction, shrouded by myth, remains a significant
factor in blacks' failure to obtain meaningful relief against historic racial injustice.").
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dominant culture "sleeps well at night," 68 while "outgroups ' ,69 live the reality of
the shortcomings of American myths. Native Americans are intimately familiar
with this lived irony. Whatever the legal root of such rights and expectationsthe Constitution, treaties, or other laws-America has utterly failed to deliver
on its commitments. "The Constitution has survived for two centuries and,
despite earnest efforts by committed people, the contradiction remains, shielded
and nurtured through the years by myth. 70 Yet, must we surrender such ideals
where the promises remain elusive to so many and the remedial path is fraught
with peril?
Supreme Court jurisprudence and congressional action have paid lip
service to tribal sovereignty but fail to be inspired by it. "In the midst of this
American society, so well policed, so sententious, so charitable, a cold
selfishness and complete insensibility prevails when it is a question of the
natives of the country."'' The challenge, of course, inherent in the notion of
"sovereignty" is to give honor and human tribal dignity by shifting the
perspective from that of the federal policymaker to the stewards of tribal
destiny, namely, Indians themselves. But at some point, these deeper troubling
questions about our country's tortured history with its indigenous people have
to give way to more practical concerns like whether litigants have sufficient and
meaningful access to justice. This is where McNeill shines.

68. Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor OppositionistsandOthers: A Pleafor Narrative,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2413-14 (1989) ("Those in power sleep well at night-their conduct
does not seem to them like oppression.").
69. Id. at 2412 (articulating the need for the narrative telling of "counterstories" by
"outgroups, groups whose marginality defines the boundaries of the mainstream, whose voice
and perspective-whose consciousness-has been suppressed, devalued, and abnormalized").
70. Bell, supra note 64, at 7.
71. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, JouRNEY TO AMERICA 200 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., 1960).
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